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STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
A.

Nature of the Case.

In 2015, Plaintiffs/Respondents Bonnie and Matt Latvala ("the Latvalas") purchased half of
a land-locked mining claim on Lake Pend Oreille. The property, described as the south half of the
Sulphide Lode Claim ("Sulphide South" or "the Latvala property"), is topographically-challenged.
There is no evidence that Sulphide South was ever mined or occupied by anyone. In fact, there is no
evidence that Sulphide South was ever used for anything.
Sulphide South was listed for sale for several years. The listing price was reduced over time
from $600,000 to $150,000. The Latvalas closed on the property in 2015 for $100,000. Their title
policy excepted coverage for any recorded access. Their seller was unsuccessful in his prior efforts
to procure an easement. The Latvalas' realtor described Sulphide South as "boat access only."
After closing, the Latvalas then promptly sued all parties who had an ownership interest in
South Camp Bay Road, which is a private road that runs through the Defendants' properties. South
Camp Bay Road could potentially be extended to Sulphide South. Attached as Addendum Bis a map
showing the general orientation of the properties and the parties involved. 1

1

By way of reference to Addendum B, the terminus of Camp Bay Road, which is a public
road, is shown in the upper left in red. South Camp Bay Road, a private road, is shown in blue
traveling in a generally-southeasterly direction to a "tum-around" at the eastern edge of property
currently owned by Defendant Grubb. A 280 +/- foot trail extends from the terminus of South Camp
Bay Road across property of the United States Fore st Service (U. S.F. S.) to Sulphide North. Outlined
in green is property owned by the U.S.F.S., which surrounds the Sulphide Claim on three (3) sides,
with the remaining side fronting on Lake Pend Oreille.

Camp Bay Road is a public road that ends on property owned by Appellant Green
Enterprises, Inc. ("Green"). South Camp Bay Road, under a recorded easement, begins at the
terminus of Camp Bay Road and proceeds in a southeasterly direction across properties owned by
Defendants Frank, Camp Bay, LLC, Edwards, Cox, Grubb, and Cummins. South Camp Bay Road
ends at a "turn-around," located at the southeast corner of Govt. Lot 1. At the end of South Camp
Bay Road is a 28 0 +/- foot trail over an intervening parcel owned by the U.S. F. S. That trail ends on
Sulphide North, which is owned by Defendant Gill. 2
The Latvalas asserted a prescriptive claim over South Camp Bay Road for ingress, egress,
and utilities. Neither Bonnie nor Matt had any personal knowledge of any prior use of South Camp
Bay Road by any prior owners of Sulphide South. They did not present any testimony of any person
with personal knowledge of such use. Instead, they relied upon their "interpretation" of an
incomplete set of historic documents. Intentionally omitted from their documentation was a copy of
the only contemporaneously produced government map of access to the Sulphide Claim when it was
last alleged to have been mined in 1954. Ex. DD.
Following two (2) defense motions for summary judgment, and a four-day trial, the District
Court entered Judgment for the Latvalas, awarding them a prescriptive easement for ingress, egress,
and utilities over the entirety of South Camp Bay Road. The District Court also rejected the
2

In 1982, when the Sulphide Claim was segregated into Sulphide North (the Gill property)
and Sulphide South (the Latvala property), an expressed easementofingress and egress was reserved
for Sulphide South over Sulphide North in a "location to be subsequently agreed upon." Ex. 19. The
District Court's Judgment fixed the location of that easement, and Gill has not joined in this appeal.
2

Defendants' claim that the Latvalas' intended development and use of Sul phi de South for residential
purposes was an unreasonable expansion in use of any rights the Latvalas could claim by
prescription.
Defendants Green Enterprises, Inc., Frank, and Cummins timely appealed. Respondents
Latvala cross-appealed as to those parties. The District Court's Amended Judgment has become final
as to the remaining Defendants.

B.

Course of the Proceedings.

On August 14, 201 7, the Latvalas filed their initial Complaint against Green, The Cedarside
Defendants, and Gill. R., pp. 31-68. The Latvalas asserted a claim against all Defendants who owned
property traversed by any portion of South Camp Bay Road (Green, the Cedarside Defendants, and
Grubb). R., pp. 47-49. The claim, characterized as one for quiet title, asserted various alternative
bases for an alleged easement for ingress, egress, and utilities, including an easement by implication
and an easement by prescription. Id.
The Latvalas' initial Complaint also included a separate claim against Gill. R., pp. 49-52.
That claim, characterized as one for quiet title, sought to declare and determine the location of an
easement for ingress and egress, for the benefit of Sulphide South (the Latvala property) over
Sulphide North (the Gill property). Id. This claim was predicated upon an express easement granted
by Gill's predecessor. Ex. 19.
The Latvalas' initial Complaint also included a claim for eminent domain, as against all

3

Defendants, pursuant to LC. § 7-703. R., pp. 52-53. 3 The Latvalas also included a claim for
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief against all Defendants, seeking to enjoin them from
precluding access to the Latvala property by way of South Camp Bay Road or the Gill property. R.,
p. 52. The Latvalas alleged, in support of all of their claims, that they sought an easement of ingress,
egress, and utilities in order to '"build on their property." R., p. 45 (i-f 3.57) and p. 46 (i13.60).
The Cedarside Defendants and Gill answered the Latvalas' Complaint and denied the
Latvalas' claims. R., pp. 9 3-112. Defendant Green separately answered the Latvalas' Complaint, also
denying the Latvalas' claims. R., pp. 113-21. 4
On January 23, 2018, the Latvalas filed their first motion to amend their Complaint. R., pp.
128-70. The motion was granted. R., pp. 222-23. The Latvalas' First Amended Complaint amended
the legal bases for the Latvalas' claim for eminent domain from I.C. § 7-703 to I.C. §§ 47-701, et

seq. and/or 47-901, et seq. R., p. 247 (i17.10). 5 The Latvalas' First Amended Complaint further

3

1.C. § 7-703 is found in Idaho's general eminent domain statutory regime. l.C. § 7-701, et
seq. While Idaho law recognizes a private right of condemnation under this statutory regime, in
certain circumstances, that right does not generally extend to a claim by a private person to condemn
a right-of-way to provide access to a private residence. Cohen v. Larson, 125 Idaho 82, 867 P .2d 956
(1993).
4

Green Enterprises, Inc. was represented at trial by attorney Paul W. Daugharty. All
remaining Defendants were represented by attorney John F. Magnuson. Following entry of
Judgment, Magnuson substituted for Daugharty as counsel for Green Enterprises, Inc., which is one
of the three (3) Appellants now before this Court.
5

Section 47-701, et seq. sets forth provisions applicable to State mineral lands. Section 47901, et seq. authorizes the owner of a mining claim to '"acquire a right-of-way for ingress and egress,
when necessary in working such mining claim .... " See I. C. § 47-901.
4

clarified that their claims for an easement for ingress, egress, and utilities were intended to allow
them to build on their property for residential purposes. Id.
All Defendants subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. R., pp. 264-66; 458-59.

The Defendants argued, inter alia. that: (1) with respect to the Cedarside and Green properties, the
Latvala property (Sulphide South) did not share a prior '"unity of title," and therefore no claim for
an implied easement could be stated;6 (2) the Latvalas were not entitled to a prescriptive easement
for ingress, egress, and utilities over the Green and Cedarside properties as the same would constitute
an unreasonable expansion in use given that there was no evidence that the Latvala property had ever
been used for anything; and (3) there was no evidence that the Latvalas were entitled to an easement
for ingress and egress under LC. § 47-901, et seq. given that there was no evidence of any mining
having ever been done on Sulphide South. R., pp. 814-45.
The Latvalas' opposing materials included the Declaration of Bonnie Latvala, which
consisted of forty-two (42) pages, two hundred twenty-three (223) paragraphs, and sixty-seven (67)
exhibits. R., pp. 5 88- 777. 7 Following argument, the District Court entered its Memorandum Decision

6

The Sulphide Claim (including both the Gill and Latvala properties) is surrounded by United
States Forest Service land. Ex. B. The Sulphide Claim was never a part of Govt. Lot 3 (the Green
property) or Govt. Lots 1 and 2 (the former Putnam property, which was also referred to in
proceedings below as the Cedarside property).
7

What was later found to be most telling was what Bonnie's Declaration did not include: a
copy of the only independently-prepared map of access to the Sulphide Claim when the Gill portion
of the property was alleged to have been mined in 1954. This map was included in an October 18,
1954 Memorandum from representatives of the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Bureau of
Mines to the United States Department of the Interior. Ex. DD. Although Bonnie was aware of the

5

of August 31, 2018. R., 919-59.
In its Memorandum Decision, the District Court set forth forty-nine (49) findings of
undisputed fact determined in the context of the Defendants' summary judgment motion. R., pp.
931-45. The District Court granted the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the
Latvalas' claim for an easement by implication over those portions of South Camp Bay Road located
on the Green and Cedarside properties. R., pp. 947-48. The District Court denied the Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment in all other respects, finding material issues of fact after liberally
construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Latvalas. R., pp. 951-57.
Finally, the District Court, with no motion pending, and on its own initiative, granted a preliminary
injunction against the Defendants in order "to maintain the status quo" pursuant to IRCP 65( e )(2)
with no consideration as to the posting of any bond or security. R., p. 957. 8
The Latvalas then filed a "Second Motion to Amend Complaint." R., pp. 960-70; I 022-33.
The Latvalas' proposed Second Amended Complaint sought to add claims specific to Gill and to the
Gill property. Id. The Latvalas sought to add claims for a declaratory ruling as to the location of the
common boundary line between the Latvala/Gill properties and for an award of damages based on

document at the time she filed her Declaration in opposition to the Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, she failed to disclose or produce the same. Tr., p. 433. The document's existence was
subsequently discovered by Defendants in late December of 2018. R., pp. 1308-48.
8

IRCP 65(a)(l) provides, "The Court may issue a preliminary injunction only on notice to
the ad verse party." At no point in time prior to the Court's issuance of its August 8, 20 I 8
Memorandum Decision did the Latvalas file a motion for a preliminary injunction or otherwise bring
the request before the Court for hearing with any form of notice.

6

an allegation that Gill had removed survey markers. Id. By stipulation of the parties, the Court
granted the Latvalas' Second Motion to Amend. R., pp. 1099-1100. The Second Amended Verified
Complaint also restated the prior claims against the Defendants and added the Gill-specific claims
as described above.

R., pp. 1215-56. In addition, the Second Amended Complaint included

allegations that the Latvalas were seeking an easement ofingress, egress, and utilities for residential
construction purposes on Sulphide South. R., pp. 1228

(,r 361), 1239 (,r 710).

On December 26, 2018, the Defendants filed a renewed Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment. R., pp. 113 8-41. Defendants requested, inter alia, entry of summary judgment declaring
that any easement by prescription to which the Latvalas could be entitled, over South Camp Bay
Road, did not include a right for ingress and egress for purposes of constructing or maintaining a
residence on the Latvala property. Id. There was no disputed issue of fact that the Latvala property
had never been used for anything. R., pp. 1187-91. As such, the Defendants argued that the issue of
whether the increased use ofthe road amounted to an ''expansion of the original [claimed] easement"
or merely an "increase in degree of use" was a question oflaw and ripe for determination. Gibbens
v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633,570 P.2d 870 (1977).
On January 16, 2019, the Defendants sought leave under IRCP 56(b)(2) to submit additional
materials in support of their motion (which was noticed for hearing on January 23, 2019). R., pp.
1305-08. The Defendants sought leave to submit the Declaration of Julie Frank (one of the
Defendants), who had only recently discovered the existence of the October 18, 1954 Memorandum

7

to the U.S. Department of the Interior from the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Bureau of
Mines. R., pp. 1308-49. The October 18, 1954 Memorandum is the only independently-created map
of access to the Sulphide Claim at the time the Claim is alleged to have last been mined. The
Memorandum was later admitted at trial as Ex. DD.
On January 22, 2019, three (3) months prior to trial, the Latvalas filed a "'Third Motion to
Amend Complaint." R., pp. 1388-90. The Latvalas sought to add a claim for condemnation under
I.C. § 7-701, et seq. Id. While such a claim was included in the Latvalas' initial Complaint (R., p.
52), the Latvalas, with Court approval, subsequently filed their First and Second Amended
Complaints, both of which removed any claim under I.C. § 7-701, et sq. The Latvalas did not notice
their Third Motion to Amend for hearing.
On January 28, 2019, the Court entered its "Memorandum Decision and Order" on
Defendants' Second Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. R., pp. 1502-07. The Court held, in
pertinent part that triable issues of fact existed, including issues regarding:
(1)

The relative burden imposed on the servient estate during the period of
adverse use versus the Latvalas' proposed residential use, and whether the
Latvalas' proposed use represents a decrease in the burden on the servient
estate; and

(2)

The historical use of the Sulphide Lode Mining property (composed of
Sulphide North owned by the Gill Living Trust and Sulphide South owned
by the Latvalas), and whether residential structures or electricity services
were ever used on the property.

R., pp. 1505-06.

8

On January 31, 2019, the District Court, on its own initiative and sua sponte, also entered
an Order granting the Latvalas' "Third Motion to Amend." R., pp. 1508-11. The District Court did
not address or note the fact that the Court had previously ordered that motions to amend the
pleadings were barred after October 9, 2018. R., pp. 913-14. The Latvalas' Third Amended
Complaint was subsequently filed on February 8, 201 9. R., p. 1512.
The parties proceeded to try the matter before the District Court on April 23-26, 2019. The
District Court took the matter under advisement and the parties provided written closing arguments.
The Latvalas filed a post-trial "Motion to Conform Pleadings to the Evidence," seeking to add an
alternative claim over the roadway depicted in the October 18, 1954 Memorandum from the U.S.
G .S. and U .S.B.M. to the U.S. Department of the Interior. R., pp. 1852-54. The Defendants opposed
the Latvalas' "Motion to Conform Pleadings," arguing that the same was predicated upon a theory
not included within the Latvalas' four (4) prior variants of their Complaint and also because the
claim was, by necessity, predicated upon the October 18, 1954 Memorandum (admitted as Ex. DD),
which the Latvalas were aware of but did not produce. R., pp. 1945-59.
On July 9, 2019, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order (R., pp. 2021-81)
and Judgment (R., pp. 2082-85). The Court held, in pertinent part, as follows:
( 1)

The Court quieted an easement for ingress, egress, and utilities for the benefit
of the Latvala property over, across, and under all portions of South Camp
Bay Road.

(2)

The Court determined that the easement quieted in favor of the Latvalas "may
be used for residential purposes, and includes the right to use, repair,

9

improve, and maintain South Camp Bay Road for vehicular and utility access
to Sulphide South."
The Court awarded costs in favor of the Latvalas and entered permanent injunctive relief consistent
with the foregoing. R., p. 2080. 9
The Latvalas subsequently filed their Cost Memorandum. R., pp. 2086-98. Both the Latvalas
and the Defendants moved to amend the Court's Judgment. R., pp. 2147-49, 2150-53. On August
16,2019, Defendants Green, Frank, and Cummins timely filed their Notice of Appeal. R., pp. 216274. On September 5, 2019, the Court entered its "Amended Judgment." R., pp. 2180-97. The
Amended Judgment awarded costs in favor of the Latvalas, and against all Defendants, jointly and
severally, in the amount of Ten Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Seven Dollars ($10,787). R., p.
2182. On September 16, 2019, Defendants Green, Frank, and Cummins timely filed their First
Amended Notice of Appeal from the District Court's Amended Judgment of September 5, 2019. R.,
pp. 2224-50.
C.

Concise Statement of Facts.

In 1906, the U. S. Surveyor General caused Mineral Survey No. 2117 to be recorded. Ex.
H. The survey described a patented mining claim known as "Sulphide Lode." Id. The Plat showed
no roads extending to or through the Sulphide Claim. Id.

9

The Court entered other specific relief as to Gill. This included a determination of the
location of the common boundary between the Gill and Latvala properties; an award of $2,000 in
damages as against Gill; and a decree fixing the location of the expressed easement over the Gill
property which had been created in 1988 by Bonner County Instrument No. 346243 (Ex. 19). Gill
did not join in this appeal. Accordingly, the Judgment is final with respect to Gill.
10

In I 907, the United States issued Lida H. Putnam a patent to Govt. Lots 1 and 2. Ex. J; SF
2. 10 In 1909, the United States issued John Van Schravendyk a patent to Govt. Lot 3. Ex. K; SF 1. 11
In 1908, Van Schravendyk was in possession of Govt. Lot 3 and perfecting his homestead
rights. At that time, Bonner County's Commissioners approved a Petition (contained in a Viewer's
Report) to declare Camp Bay Road a public road. Ex. I. Camp Bay Road, as shown on Page 1 of the
Viewer's Report, terminated at a specifically-defined point within Govt. Lot 3. Id. The 1907
Viewer's Report showed no further extension of Camp Bay Road, including any extension to the
South (i.e., to the Putnam property or to the Sulphide Claim). Id.
In July of 1910, the United States issued Messrs. Teape, Garrison, Hipke, and VanHemert
(collectively referred to herein as ·Teape") a patent to the Sulphide Claim as "designated by the
Surveyor General as Survey No. 2117." Ex. M; SF 4. The Latvalas admitted at trial that they had
no personal knowledge of any road by which Teape could have accessed the Sulphide Claim. Tr.,
pp. 422-23. We yet know that the Sulphide Claim had workings near the shore of Lake Pend Oreille
abutting the Gill property. Ex. YYY; Tr., pp. 427,439. We also know that in 1906, Garrison and
VanHemert had other neighboring mine operations which were also on the shore of Lake Pend

10

The use of the acronym "SF" should be understood to refer to '"Stipulated Facts" embodied
in a pre-trial Order Deeming Facts Established for Trial Pursuant to IRCP 56©, entered April 18,
2019. R., pp. 1673-91.
11

Attached as Exhibit B to the Addendum to this Brief is a copy of Ex. A as admitted at trial.
The Van Schravendyk property (Lot 3) is outlined in yellow. The Putnam property (Lots 1 and 2)
are outlined in pink. The adjoining U.S. Forest Service property is outlined in green. The Sulphide
Claim (consisting of the Gill and Latvala properties) is shown in the lower right of Addendum B.
11

Oreille. Ex. CCCC. Those operations, in neighboring Garfield Bay, were described as "a few rods
from the lake front and the accessibility to transportation is a wonder in itself as the expense of
getting the ore from the mine to the boat will be practically nothing." Id. Ultimately, the members
of the Teape group died and title to the Sulphide Claim reverted to Bonner County for delinquent
taxes. Ex. BB.
The Sulphide Claim lies outside of Govt. Lots 1 and 2 (the Putnam property). Ex. B (also
attached as Addendum A). The Sulphide Claim is surrounded on three (3) sides by property of the
U.S. Forest Service. Id.

In 1927, Van Schravendyk granted a recorded right-of-way easement to

Putnam, for the benefit of Govt. Lots I and 2, extending south and southeasterly from the terminus
of Camp Bay Road. Ex. N. At the time, Putnam confirmed to Van Schravendyk that "[t]he road
would still be private each owning our present part as to title." Ex. T (Green Enterprises).
The earliest Metsker map admitted at trial was from 1939. Ex. FFFF. Although the Latvalas
offered many maps as exhibits at trial, they neither offered nor identified the 1939 Metsker map as
an exhibit. A copy is attached as Addendum C to this brief. The map shows no extension of Camp
Bay Road to the south (i.e., present day South Camp Bay Road). Id. The Metsker map shows Govt.
Lots 1 and 2 (the Putnam property) as then being owned by Florence Foster. Id. 12
The evidence at trial established that during the Teape parties' ownership of the Sulphide

12

The Court will note from Ex. F that the Sulphide Claim is shown as overlapping the
southwest corner of Govt. Lot 1. All parties agreed that, in actuality, the Sulphide Claim is located
south of Govt. Lot 1 and surrounded by U.S. Forest Service property. Ex. B (Addendum A).
12

Claim, they constructed a mill for mining purposes on the north half of the Sulphide Claim (the Gill
property) near the shore of Lake Pend Oreille. Ex. DD, p. 3. In 1954, the U.S. Geological Survey
and the U.S. Bureau of Mines advised the U.S. Department of the Interior:
About 60 feet above the level of the lake an adit has been driven westward for 140
feet ... near the portal of the adit is an old tool and dry shed and near the lake level
to the northeast of the adit are the remains of the foundation of an old mill. No other
buildings are on the property.
Id. The foundation of the old mill still exists today and is located on the north half of the Sulphide
Claim (the Gill property). Exs. YYY; ZZZ; AAAA.
This "adit," mapped and located by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Bureau ofMines
in 1954, was described as "the lower adit." Ex. DD at Map #IA. This adit was also referred to at
trial as the "lower adit." An "adit" is generally defined as an approach or entrance to a mine.
The Latvalas offered no evidence as to how the Sulphide Claim was accessed by the Teape
group. The evidence at trial supported the conclusion that the Teape parties accessed the claim by
water. Specifically, there was no evidence offered by the Latvalas as to any road to the Sulphide
Claim during the Teape period of ownership; the first easement to the Putnam property (Lots 1 and
2) was not granted until 1927, over twenty (20) years after the Sulphide Claim was patented; and a
mill was constructed at the edge of the shore near the lower adit. It runs counter to all of the evidence
to suggest that the Teape parties accessed the Sulphide Claim over a non-existent and unknown road
for purposes of working the lower adit and then taking ore processed by the waterside mill back up
a veritable cliff to transport the same over a non-existent road back to some unidentified smelter.

I3

In September of 1939, Howard Thomason acquired title to the Sulphide Claim from Bonner
County. Ex. BB; SF 5. Thomason acquired the claim "for delinquent taxes." Id. After acquiring title
to the Sulphide Claim, Thomason located four (4) additional claims. SF 13-16. These four (4)
additional claims were unpatented claims. A patented claim is owned by the holder thereof in fee
simple. An unpatented claim is located on property owned by the United States and may be worked
by the holder of the claim subject to the requirement that, among other things, the holder file annual
proofs of labor evidencing work on the claims.
One of Thomason's unpatented claims bears note. Thomason located the "Honest John
Claim," which provided contiguity between the north boundary of the Sulphide Claim and the south
boundary of the former Putnam property (Govt. Lot 1). Ex. BB; Ex. DD (Map #I).
In 1939, Thomason made a deal with a third-party who ultimately "neglected to do any
amount of development work on the claims." Ex. BB, p. 1. The party with whom Thomason
contracted ultimately defaulted, and Thomason terminated the agreement. Id. Any work initiated
in 1939 by Thomason, after acquiring title to the Sulphide Claim, stopped and the property remained
idle for at least seven (7) years (until 1946). Id. A proof of labor as to the Honest John Claim was
recorded in 1940 for labor performed in 1939. SF 17.
In 1946, Thomason began making inquiries in aid of a request for federal financial assistance
to develop the Sulphide Claim and his four (4) adjacent unpatented claims. Ex. BB. Thomason
advised the U.S. Department of the Interior, by way of directions to the claims, that there was a
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"county road from Sagle, Idaho within one-half mile of the property [inferentially Camp Bay Road],
private road balance of distance." Id. at p. 580.
After I 946, Thomason filed no further proofs oflabor on the Honest John or other unpatented
claims until September of 1954. Ex. 73. Thomason's 1954 ''Proof of Labor" stated that Thomason
had performed at least five hundred dollars ($500) worth of work on the unpatented claims during
the 1954 calendar year. Id. On September 28, 1954, Thomason entered into a "Mining Lease" with
George Johnson and E. Vernon Anderson.

Ex. 80. The Lease was for five (5) years and

encompassed the Sulphide Claim and the adjoining unpatented claims (including the Honest John
Claim). Id.
Anderson and Johnson, as lessees, then made an application to the U.S. Department of the
Interior for federal assistance under the "Defense Minerals Exploration Administration" (DMEA).
Exs. CC; DD. The DMEA program was established within the Department of the Interior in 1951.
R., p. 1866. The program was confined to exploration for critical and strategic minerals. Id. Some
applications for financial assistance with respect to mineral exploration, made by private parties,
were considered by the Department. Id. The DMEA program used the U.S. Geological Survey and
U.S. Bureau of Mines Field Teams and operated until 1958, when federally-supported mineral
exploration under the Defense Production Act of 1950 was no longer considered justifiable and the
DMEA program was terminated. R., pp. 1866-67.
According to their 1954 submittal, Thomason and Anderson "wish[ed] to know if the
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property would be considered a feasible area for a DMEA project." Ex. CC. An initial examination
of the claims was made by the U.S. Department of the Interior on August 12, 1954. Id. This
examination included an on-site inspection of the Sulphide Claim and the four (4) unpatented claims.
Id. The examination took eight (8) hours and was done in the physical presence of the lessees
(Anderson and Johnson) as well as Thomason (the lessor). Id.
The U.S. Department of the Interior's Memorandum Report noted the following: there was
both an upper tunnel (adit) and a lower tunnel (adit); "the surroundings are not suggestive of a large
deposit;" "the present prospect will not support overhead;" and "the owners and lessees are not mine
operators so that a 'promotional venture' may be their objective." Id.
Also included in the U.S. Department of the Interior's "Examination Report" was a handdrawn map which showed one access road terminating at the "upper tunnel." Ex. CC (p. 590) (a
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum D). The map depicts an extension from the end of
the public road (Camp Bay Road), proceeding in a southeasterly direction to the area encompassed
by Thomason's claim group. Thomason's submittals also included a schematic generally depicting
the claim group (which he referred to as "the Silver Fox Group of Claims"). Ex. CC (p. 591)
(Addendum E hereto).
Thomason' s Claim Group was subsequently examined on Octo her 7, 19 54 by Willard Puffet,
Geologist with the U.S. Geological Survey, and Webster Anderson, Engineer with the U.S. Bureau
of Mines. Ex. DD. Anderson and Puffet noted that Thomason's lessees, Anderson and Johnson,
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were employed as a car dealer and an excavator, respectively. Id. They had no known experience in
mining. Id. Puffet and Anderson also observed the lower adit, near the shore of Lake Pend Oreille,
as well as the upper adit, which he noted to be approximately 120 feet higher in elevation than the
lower adit. Id. Both the upper and lower adits were depicted on a hand-drawn map (Map #IA to Ex.
DD) prepared by Anderson and Puffet (as acknowledged in the lower left corner of the same). The
map was dated October 7, 1954, the same date that Puffet and Anderson conducted their on-site field
inspection. Id. A copy of the map is attached as Addendum F. 13
On October 18, 1954, Puffet and Anderson also prepared a map showing the actual access
to Thomason's claims. Ex. DD (Map #I). A copy of this map is attached as Addendum H. The
U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. map shows the contemporaneous access to the claim group in October of 1954
as determined by two (2) independent governmental agencies. That access is consistent with a road
extending southeasterly from the terminus of Camp Bay Road, crossing the present-day acreage of
Fred Grubb (Parcel 00050000A000AA or Tract A on Ex. B (Addendum A)); and terminating near
the upper adit.
At trial, Bonnie Latvala testified that she "'looked for every single thing related to this
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Several features to Map #IA of Ex. DD were noted in an illustrative exhibit, colored to
highlight several features, which was admitted at trial as Ex. PPPP. These included the location of
the lower adit; the lack of any depicted road access from the terminus of South Camp Bay Road over
the intervening U.S.F.S. property lying north of the Sulphide Claim; the upper adit (shown at the
terminus of a "road" shown as approaching from the northwest and ending in a "T"); and a "Camp"
north of the upper adit, either on the Gill property (the north half of the Sulphide Claim) or the
Honest John Claim. Id. A copy of Ex. PPPP is attached hereto as Addendum G.
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property [the Sulphide Claim] that I could find .... " Tr., pp. 418; 429-30. She also testified that she
reviewed more than a thousand documents produced to the Defendants prior to production. Tr., p.
419. She further admitted that she actually located a copy of the 1954 U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. Inspection
Report (including the Puffet/Anderson map) at least ten (10) months before trial. Tr., pp. 429-433;
436-37. Despite the fact that the 1954 U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. report (Ex. DD) is one of only two (2)
documents that shows access to the Sulphide Claim while it was actually alleged to have been mined,
Bonnie did not produce or disclose the document's existence to Defendants. Id. At trial she admitted
that the map was "absolutely" relevant, even though she chose not to disclose it or to produce it. Tr.,
p. 447.
The U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Bureau of Mines concluded, 'There is no
justification for favorable consideration of this property as a site for a DMEA project." Ex. DD, p.
5. There was no evidence introduced of any mining activity on the Sulphide Claim or on the
neighboring unpatented claims after the October 1954 denial of the DMEA request. No further
"proofs of labor" were introduced with respect to any of the four (4) unpatented claims. Ultimately,
those claims reverted to the U.S. Forest Service for inactivity. R., p. 1872. Bonnie Latvala testified
that she had no personal knowledge of any mining activity on any ofThomason's claims (including
the Sulphide Claim) after the DMEA application for assistance was denied. Tr., p. 440.
At trial, Dale Gill offered testimony as to the general location of the upper adit generally
uphill and west of the lower adit. Tr., p. 853. Defendants Janet and Russell Edwards also offered
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testimony as to the general location of the upper adit. Tr., pp. 1092-93; 1113-15. Larimore
Cummins, a Defendant and Appellant, also testified as to the approximate location of the upper adit.
Tr., pp. 999-1003; Ex. D-6 (Green Enterprises). Gill testified that there were "remains of a roadway
in front of the [upper] adit. Tr., p. 853.
Edwards, Gill, and Cummins, although offering differing opinions as to the precise physical
location of the upper adit, "on the ground" so to speak, all uniformly testified that the upper adit was
located west of, and uphill from, the lower adit. The Puffet and Anderson Report from October of
1954 located the upper adit west and approximately one hundred twenty (120) feet higher (in
elevation) than the lower adit.
While the Latvalas did not produce or seek to introduce the October 1954 U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M.
map (Ex. DD), they did offer several other maps at trial, many of which are discussed below. The
Latvalas introduced a 1949 Department of the Interior Geological Survey Excerpt. Ex. 51. A copy
is included as Addendum I to this brief. As can be seen from Ex. 51, there are two road shown as
traveling southeasterly from the terminus of Camp Bay Road (the public road). One generally travels
along the route of present-day South Camp Bay Road, terminating at the southeast boundary of Govt.
Lot I and not shown as extending over the U.S. Forest Service property lying between Govt. Lot 1
and the north boundary of the Sulphide Claim. As can also be seen from Ex. 51, there is a second
road, also approaching from the northwest (consistent with the road orientation depicted by Puffet
and Anderson), terminating at the "e" at the end of the phrase "Sulphide Mine."

19

The Latvalas also offered Ex. 52, a 1951 U.S.G.S. map (a copy of which is included as
Addendum J to this brief). Consistent with the 1949 map, the 1951 U. S.G .S. map shows an '"upper"
road (the road depicted by Puffet and Anderson) and a lower road (South Camp Bay Road).
The Latvalas also offered a 1960 Metsker map. Ex. 53 (a copy of which is included as
Addendum K to this brief). Like the 1949 and 1951 maps, the 1960 map shows two (2) points of
note. First, it shows South Camp Bay Road as ending at the southeasterly boundary of Lot 1 and the
U.S. Forest Service property. Second, it shows an upper road accessing the Sulphide Claim from
the northwest.
The Latvalas offered additional maps (Exs. 55, 56, 57, and 58). All of these maps were
consistent with the 1949 (Ex. 51), 1951 (Ex. 52), and 1960 (Ex. 53) maps. Simply put, they all
showed two roads. Moreover, they showed South Camp Bay Road as terminating at the southeast
corner of Govt. Lot 1 and not extending over the intervening U.S. Forest Service property to the
north boundary of the Sulphide Claim. Further, they each showed another road, approaching from
the northwest, to access the Sulphide Claim by traveling southeast through the present-day Grubb
property and then through property generally-encompassed by the unpatented Honest John Claim,
which has since reverted to the U.S.F.S. 14
In a 1982 Affidavit, recorded as Bonner County Instrument No. 2544 72, Howard Thomason,

who had acquired the Sulphide Claim in 1939 (Ex. BB), stated: "That the road to the said Sulphide
14

Despi te the fact that these maps, such as Ex. 57, clearly show two (2) roads, Bonnie Latvala
testified that they only showed one road. Tr., pp. 497-98
20

Mining Claim was in existence prior to 193 8. In I 93 8 said Affiant helped to extend said road within
said Claim." Ex. U (emphasis added); SF 28. The earliest map confirming a road "within" the
Sulphide Claim is "Map #I" as prepared by the U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. in 1954. Ex. DD (Map #I);
Addendum H. A comparison of the 1954 U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. map confirms the location of a road
extending off of South Camp Bay Road southeasterly, near the common boundary of Govt. Lots 2
and 1, and traversing over the Honest John Claim. Id. This road is distinct from South Camp Bay
Road and is consistent with the 1949, 1951, 1960, and 1976 maps (Exs. 51-53, 57).
On May 29, 1947, the Plat of"Cedarside Lots" was recorded. Ex. P (a copy of the Cedarside
Plat is attached to this brief as Addendum L). That Plat created multiple waterfront lots ("the
Cedarside Lots") out of the former Putnam property (Govt. Lots 1 and 2). Id. The balance of Lots
1 and 2 was platted as Tract A. Id. Tract A is owned by Defendant Grubb. The Cedarside lots are
accessed by a lower road, in a different location than the road extended by Thomason in 1939. Exs.
A, B. The lower road is "South Camp Bay Road," the road at issue in this proceeding. The "upper
road," as shown in the U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. map, was referred to at trial as the "Thomason road."
Russ Edwards and Gill both testified at trial that whatever road Thomason extended into the
Sulphide Claim in 1939 has been abandoned and has reverted to nature. Tr., pp. 853; 1113-14. There
is little physical or observable evidence of the same save and except for a small remnant of a roadbed
near the upper adit. The foregoing is further confirmed by the admissions made by the Latvalas'
predecessor-in-title, Terry McConnaughey, a representative of the Estate of Brian McConnaughey.
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The Estate was the party that sold the south half of the Sulphide Claim to the Latvalas. On June 27,
2014, Terry McConnaughey wrote to Fred Grubb, stating:
I inherited five acres of property called Sulfide Lode which is located adjacent to
your 51 acres ofland (Cedarside Tract A] located in Camp Bay on Lake Pend Oreille
in Bonner County, Idaho.
My property has no road access to it as it is surrounded by U.S. Forest Service land.
I am requesting an easement across your property in order to reach my property by
road. I am not planning to build a road to reach my property, however, would like to
have an easement on record to facilitate any future sale of the Sulfide Lode.
Ex. 00; Tr., p. 903. 15
Mr. McConnaughey followed up again with Grubb, in August of 2014, noting that the
McConnaughey Estate had an easement from Dale Gill (over Sulphide North) but that the Gill
easement did not provide access to South Camp Bay Road. Ex. PP. Grubb and his then-wife
(Dedmon) declined McConnaughey's request for an easement. Ex. QQ Tr., 905-06.
In 1969, Harlow McConnaughey arranged for the purchase of the Sulphide Claim from
Thomason. SF 23. In I 970, Harlow sought a Special Use Permit from the U.S.F.S. to access the
Sulphide Claim over the intervening property lying between the terminus of South Camp Bay Road
and the north boundary of the Sulphide Claim. Ex. EE. The U.S.F.S. advised McConnaughey: "We
will provide access to your land across National Forest land on the existing road with a Special Use
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Exs. 00, PP and QQ were admitted at trial. Tr., pp. 903-05. They were inadvertently
omitted from the Clerk's Record on Appeal, although the contents ofboth exhibits were testified to
by Sue Ann Dedmon, Fred Grubb' s former wife. Tr., p. 901. Appellants have since moved the Court
to supplement the Clerk's Record with Exhibits 00, PP, and QQ.
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Permit. We do not have right-of-way across the private land between our land and the county road."
Id. The "private land" between the U.S. F. S. property and the County road (Camp Bay Road) consists
of Lots 1 and 2 (first owned by Putnam, later platted as Cedarside, and now including the Grubb
property (Tract A)) and Lot 3, owned by Green Enterprises, Inc., i.e., South Camp Bay Road.
In 1982, Harlow Mcconnaughey conveyed the north halfof the Sulphide Claim to Elmer and
Jeanette Whorton. Ex. 16; SF 26. This conveyance was referred to at trial as the "Sulphide
Segregation." The conveyance created what the parties have referred to as the Gill property
(Sulphide North) and the Latvala property (Sulphide South). The contract by which Mcconnaughey
agreed to convey the Gill property to the Whortons stated: '' [T] he Grant or [McConnaughey] reserves
a right-of-way for ingress and egress for the benefit of the southerly portion of the said Sulphide
Lode mining claim, location to be subsequently agreed upon." Ex. 16; SF 26. In 2005, Gill
ultimately succeeded to title to the north half of the Sulphide Claim. Ex. Z.
In 1991, Brian McConnaughey succeeded to Harlow McConnaughey's interest in Sulphide
South (the Latvala property). Ex. Y. Brian later passed away. Terry McConnaughey, representative
for Brian's Estate, advised members of Brian's family that he had met at the property with Dale Gill.
Ex. MM. Gill noted that the Estate's realtor had put up a for sale sign on the Gill property and that
Sulphide South had no road access across the Gill property from South Camp Bay Road. Id. Terry
then advised Brian's family "We have to see if we can gain a road easement from the Green Bay
Road and across U.S. Forest Service land, a distance of about a quarter of a mile." Id. Green Bay
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Road is a wholly-separate road, unrelated to the roads at issue in this proceeding, which abuts that
portion of the U.S.F.S. property lying west of and adjacent to the Sulphide Claim. Ex. XX. Terry
further confirmed that the Estate was seeking $600,000 for the Latvala property. Ex. MM. In 2012,
Gill again contacted the Estate's listing agent. Ex. NN. Gill repeated that the Latvala prope1iy had
no legal right of access over South Camp Bay Road. Id.
In 2015, Terry prepared the following statement:
The only time I ever used South Camp Bay Road to access my portion of the
Sulphide Lode property was during the month of July 2009, which was shortly after
my siblings and I inherited it. At that time, I was accosted by Mr. Dale Gill who
informed me I was trespassing on his property and wanted me to leave. After that
event, whenever I wanted to access my portion of the Sulphide Lode property, I used
the Mineral Point Trail Road [Green Bay Road] where I parked my vehicle and
proceeded to walk approximately one-quarter mile to my portion of the Sulphide
Lode property.
Ex.RR.
The Estate continued to attempt to sell the Latvala property following Brian's passing. The
2009 price of $600,000 was reduced to $300,000 in 2012. Ex. YY. The price was later reduced to
$175,000. Id. In 2016, the price was again reduced to $150,000. Id.
The 2015 listing information for the Latvala property contained the following confidential
agent remarks: 'There is legal easement across North Sulphide Lode lot. No road has been
established as of yet. There is no legal access across South Camp Bay Road. See attached access
instructions." Ex. YY. The referenced access instructions set forth directions to Green Bay Road,
with trail access to the property by way of Green Bay Road and over the Mineral Point Trail. Ex.
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XX.
In October of 2015, the Latvalas signed an "Exclusive Right to Represent" with real estate
agent Christian Thompson. Ex. AAA. The Latvalas had looked at the Sulphide South property once
before, in approximately 2009, and in so doing they had accessed the property by Green Bay Road
and Mineral Point Trail. Tr., pp. 924.
The Latvalas' agent (Thompson) expressed the following opinion: "I am not sure it [Sulphide
South] would appraise for $100,000. It's boat access only. Difficult to build on. No power." Ex.
DDD. The listing agent's remarks for Sulphide South also stated, "No legal access over South Camp
Bay Road." Ex. III. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Latvalas made an offer to purchase Sulphide
South for $85,000. Id.
The Latvalas and the McConnaughey Estate ultimately entered into a Purchase and Sale
Agreement which included the following terms: (I) a purchase price of $100,000; and (2) the
"Property is being sold as is, where is as to the physical condition of the property and road access
thereto and no representation shall be made on behalf of the Estate with respect thereto." Ex. JJJ
(Counteroffer No. 4). After executing the PSA, but before closing, the Latvalas received information
which included the following:
•

Terry McConnaughey's notarized statement (Ex. RR), in which he stated he
had only accessed Sulphide South once by way of South Camp Bay Road;
that he was told he was trespassing by Mr. Gill; and that he subsequently used
Green Bay Road and Mineral Point Trail for access.

•

A 1970 U.S.F.S. letter to Howard Mcconnaughey telling him that the
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U.S.F.S. "do[es] not have right-of-way across the private land between our
land and the county road."
Ex. LLL. The Latvalas closed the transaction under a title policy that specifically excluded recorded
access. Ex. MMM.
After closing, the Latvalas applied to the U.S.F.S. for a Special Use Permit to cross the
U.S.F.S. property lying north of the Gill property (Sulphide North) and southeast of Govt. Lot 1. The
permit was issued August 10, 2016. Ex. GG. Gill subsequently lodged an objection to U. S.F .S. with
respect to the permit. On September 5, 2017, the U.S.F.S. responded directly to the Latvalas, with
a copy to Gill, stating:
At the time of issuance, in August of2016, the impression was that you had obtained
legal access across adjacent lands, both before and after the Forest Service parcel, in
order to reach your land. We understand there is a pending legal action regarding the
access across these private parcels [South Camp Bay Road].
The permit we issued to you does not imply or grant access, in any way, across the
adjacent private lands. Your permit for access across Forest Service land only
remains open and valid, pending the result of any decision by a court of appropriate
jurisdiction or other legal resolution.
Ex.HH.
The Latvalas responded to U. S .F. S. by stating that they had a legal right to cross South Camp
Bay Road pursuant to "a legal opinion from our attorney." Ex. II. The Latvalas provided the
U .S.F.S. with a copy of a "South Camp Bay Road" exhibit, which was later admitted at trial as Exs.
Band 4. Id. A copy is also attached hereto as Addendum A.
The "South Camp Bay Road Exhibit" was prepared by James A Sewell & Associates, LLC
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("Sewell"). The Sewell employee with oversight over the preparation of the exhibit was Mark
Duffner, PLS ("Duffner"). After purchasing Sulphide South, but prior to filing suit, Bonnie worked
with Duffner to develop the "South Camp Bay Road Exhibit" that was ultimately provided to
U.S.F.S. (Ex. II) and attached to the Latvalas' Complaint and all amendments thereto.
On May 3, 2017, Duffner advised Bonnie that "we have completed the field work and now
have to prepare the map [the "South Camp Bay Road Exhibit"]." Ex. SS. Duffner testified that he
delegated the "field work" for the preparation of the exhibit to his subordinates, Corey Allard and
Loren Mitchell. Tr., p. 630. Allard testified that Mitchell performed the field work. Tr., pp. 778-8.
Mitchell did not testify at trial.
On May 31, 201 7, Duffner prepared his initial draft of the exhibit for Bonnie. Ex. TT. Within
one day, Bonnie followed up with Duffner. Id. Bonnie instructed Duffner by e-mail to delete the text
notation "Trail-8 feet" on the U.S.F.S. property as shown on the map. Bonnie told Duffner that the
use of the term "Trail" was "counter-productive." Id.
Duffner, without personally having been on the property to gather the field work necessary
to prepare the exhibit, acceded to the Latvalas' directives, modified the exhibit accordingly, and
affixed his professional stamp to the same. Ex. UU. The exhibit, re-characterized by Bonnie, shows
South Camp Bay Road as extending over the U.S.F.S. property to the northern boundary of the
Sulphide Claim. Ex. B (Addendum A hereto).
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.
The issues as framed by Appellants are as follows:

III.

1.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY QUIETING A
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT FOR INGRESS, EGRESS, AND UTILITIES,
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE LA TV ALA PROPERTY, OVER, ACROSS,
AND UNDER THOSE PORTIONS OF SOUTH CAMP BAY ROAD
OWNED BY APPELLANTS.

2.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY DETERMINING THAT
THE LATVALAS' PROPOSED DEVELOPMENT AND RESIDENTIAL
USE ASSOCIATED WITH THE LATVALA PROPERTY DID NOT
CONSTITUTE AN UNREASONABLE EXPANSION OF THE
EASEMENT THEY CLAIMED BY PRESCRIPTION.

3.

WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE
LATVALAS' COSTS.

STANDARD OF REVIEW.
The Court must defer to the Trial Court's Findings of Fact to the extent they are supported

by substantial and competent evidence. Estate ofSkvorak v. Sec. Union Title Ins. Co., 141 Idaho 16,
19, 89 P.3d 856 (2004); IRCP 52(a). When the trial court tries the action without a jury,
determinations on the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given their testimony, the testimony's
probative effect, and inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom are all matters within the
province of the trial court. Estate of Skvorak, 140 Idaho at 19. The Court does, however, exercise
free review over conclusions of law. Id.
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IV.

ARGUMENT.
A.

The Trial Court erred by quieting a prescriptive easement for ingress,
egress, and utilities, for the benefit of the Latvala property, over, across,
and under those portions of South Camp Bay Road owned by
Appellants.
1.

Standards Applicable to Claims for Prescriptive Easements.

Easements by prescription are not favored at law. See, ~ ' Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho
633, 570 P.2d 870 (1977).
The creation of a private easement by prescription is not favored at law ...
. The elements of a prescriptive easement are described in West v. Smith, 95 Idaho
550, 511 P.2d 1326 (I 973):
"A claimant ... must submit 'reasonably clear and convincing proof
of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use, under a claim of
right, with the knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement, for
the prescriptive period"' Id. At 577.
Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho 356, 358-59, 613 P.2d 367 (1980) (additional citation
omitted).
The statutory period for acquiring an easement by prescription (five (5) years) was changed
to twenty (20) years by the amendment of LC. § 5-203, effective July 1, 2006. " However, the
twenty-year time period does not apply to an easement by prescription acquired prior to the
amendment." Capstair Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence, 153 ldaho411, 420,283 P.3d 728 (2012).
Accordingly, provided the requisite proof is made under the clear and convincing standard, a party
can acquire a prescriptive easement by an adequate showing of five (5) years of open, notorious,
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continuous, and uninterrupted use, provided that use was completed prior to June 30, 2006.
Because the law disfavors the creation of prescriptive easements, the standard of proof is by
"clear and convincing evidence." Clear and convincing evidence is a greater standard than a mere
preponderance. See, ~ ' In Re Doe, 152 Idaho 953, 957, 277 PJd 400 (2012). "Clear and
convincing evidence is generally understood to be evidence indicating that the thing to be proved
is highly probable or reasonably certain." Id.

2.

The District Court's Findings, in View of the Clear and
Convincing Standard, Are Unsupported by Substantial
Evidence.

In Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 390, 210 P.3d 75 (2009), this Court held:
A determination that a claimant has established a prescriptive easement
involves entwined questions of law and fact .... "Each element is essential to the
claim, and the trial court must make findings relevant to each element in order to
sustain a judgment on appeal." Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 229, 76 P.3d 969,
973 (2003). It is the province of the trial court to determine whether the plaintiffs
presented "reasonably clear and convincing evidence" of each of the five elements
. . . . In addition, the creation of a private easement by prescription is not favored
under Idaho law ....

Backman v. Lawrence, 147 Idaho 396 (citations omitted). This Court must defer to the trial Court's
findings of fact to the extent they are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Estate of
Skvorak, 140 Idaho at 19.
Preliminarily, it is important to note that the District Court found the elements of adverse
possession had been satisfied, with respect to South Camp Bay Road, as a result of mining activity
on the Sulphide Claim between 1946 and 1954. R., pp. 2059-61. At the same time, there was no
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evidence offered by the Latvalas of their own personal knowledge or of the personal knowledge of
any other witness. The Latvalas first viewed the property in 2009 and purchased the same six (6)
years later, in 2015. The District Court made its findings, notwithstanding the required clear and
convincing standard, based upon contradictory documentary evidence with which no witness had
personal knowledge.
3.

The District Court Disregarded Substantial Evidence that
Supports the Conclusion that South Camp Bay Road was
Never Used with Respect to Mining Operations on the
Lower Adit.

The District Court found, "The lower branch of the road [South Camp Bay Road] extends
into what is now the Forest Service Camp Bay parcel, and appears to have been the access road to
the lower tunnel at the Sulphide Lode." R., p. 2055. The Court further found, "[A]bsolutely no
historical evidence was presented at trial showing that the miners traveled to and from the lower
tunnel by boat." R., p. 2054. Substantial evidence admitted at trial shows that both findings were
unsupported by substantial evidence, particularly in light of the clear and convincing standard
required.
In 1906, Mineral Survey No. 2117, which created the Sulphide Lode Claim, was issued by
the U.S. Surveyor General. Ex. H. The Plat of the Sulphide Lode in 1906 shows no roads accessing
the claim. Id. In 1909, the United States issued a patent to the claim to the Teape/Garrison parties.
Ex. M. By inference, we know that the Teape/Garrison parties were accessing the claim by some
means other than a road prior to 1909.
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The Latvalas offered no evidence as to how the Teape/Garrison parties accessed the Sulphide
Claim during the period of their mining activity, whether before or after issuance of the patent:

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

But we don't know how they [Teape/Garrison] got there [to the Sulphide
Claim]?
Correct.
You don't know how they got there?
Correct.
No personal knowledge of how they got there?
Correct.
In fact, we don't have a map of the Sulphide Lode property prior to 1939, do
we?
Not that I'm aware of.

Tr., pp. 422-23.
Evidence was introduced, and virtually ignored by the District Court, which showed that, on
a more probable than not basis, access to the Sulphide Claim by Teape/Garrison was by boat.
Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 55, a U.S.F.S. map, shows the proximity of Camp Bay (and the Sulphide
Claim) to Garfield Bay. Ex. 55, p. 206. In 1906, under the headline "More Big Strikes at Garfield
Bay," the Northern Idaho News reported on neighboring mining activity by Garrison and Van
Hemert, both owners of the Sulphide Claim. Ex. CCCC. With respect to that neighboring mine (the
Gold Coin Claim), in Garfield Bay, two (2) of the four (4) patentees to the Sulphide Claim accessed
the claim by boat:
The main lead is only a few rods from the lakefront and the accessibility to
transportation is a wonder in itself as the expense of getting the ore from the mine to
the boat will be practically nothing.
Id. In another 1906 article, the Northern Idaho News reported that "Messrs. Garrison, Teape, Hipke,
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and Van Hemert strike it rich in Bay City." Ex. DODD. The Article notes that, with respect to the
Bay City Claim, the same parties were "working two shifts, night and day, on a tunnel which is being
run near the waterlevel of the lake .... " Id. The article further noted that the same parties owned
and were developing the Sulphide Claim. Id. Other press coverage noted that Garrison "took a pick
and went along the shores of the lake after a grub stake." Ex. BBBB. The article continued, "that
the tunnel strikes the ore body all he [Garrison] will have to do will be to drop the galena into a cart
and haul it to the lakeshore .... " Id.
The reasonable inference that the Teape/Garrison group were mining the Sulphide Claim
using water access is further underscored by photographs of the shoreline. Ex. YYY shows a
concrete foundation of an old mill adjacent to the Gill portion of the Claim. The same exhibit shows
an interlineated circle around an "X," in the upper left corner, with the location of the lower adit. Tr.,
pp. 866-68. Also in the record is Ex. AAAA, which shows the same concrete foundation and the
veritable cliff that rises above. Not only is there no map to show any road access to any portion of
the Sulphide Claim prior to 1939, it defies reason to suggest, in light of the historic articles of similar
activity by the Teape/Garrison group, that they would mine near the shoreline and take their ore up
a cliff to transport it over a non-existent road to a smelter. 16
The conclusion that water access was used to locate and initially develop the Sulphide Claim,
on a more probable than not basis, is underscored by the following additional evidence. First, Camp
16

Bonnie acknowledged that "the foundation of the old mill" was not on the Latvala property
(Sulphide South). Tr., p. 439.
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Bay Road, the public road that terminates on the Green property in Govt. Lot 3, was located pursuant
to a Viewers' Report in 1908, after the Teape/Garrison group had already been working the property
for several years. Ex. I. In 1908, it was noted, "'The entire road [Camp Bay Road] will be about three
miles in length; about one mile of which is already completed." Id. In other words, there was no
public road completed in the form of present-day Camp Bay Road while the Teape/Garrison parties
were working the Sulphide Lode. Second, it wasn't until 1927, eighteen (18) years after the Sulphide
patent was issued, that Green's predecessors granted a recordable right-of-way easement for access
from the terminus of Camp Bay Road in a southeasterly fashion to Govt. Lots 1 and 2 (the Putnam
property). Ex. N. Third, Lida Putnam contemporaneously wrote to Kate and John Van Schravendyk
emphasizing that "the road would still be private each owning our present part as to title," and that:
I want to avoid any long drawn out methods and expense to us both. I want
my time, money, and strength to get a road started.
Ex. T (Green Enterprises), pp. 856-59.

4.

The District Court Disregarded Substantial and
Competent Evidence that Supported the Conclusion that
Any Access to the Sulphide Claim, Between 1946 and
1954, was Over the Now-Non-Existent Upper Road
(Thomason Road).

Despite the optimistic reporting of the Northern Idaho News in 1906, the Sulphide Claim
apparently did not tum into a viable operation. In 1939, Howard Thomason acquired title to the
Sulphide Claim from Bonner County "for delinquent taxes." Ex. BB. Thomason then located four
(4) additional claims which, unlike the Sulphide Claim, were unpatented. SF 13-16. One of these
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claims, the "Honest John Claim," provided contiguity between the north boundary of the Sulphide
Claim and the south boundary of the former Putnam property (Govt. Lot 1). Ex. BB; Ex. DD (Map
#I). In 1982, Thomason stated by affidavit: "That the road to the said Sulphide mining claim was in
existence prior to 1938. In 1938 said affiant helped to extend said road within said Clam." Ex. U
(emphasis added); SF 28. The earliest map confirming a road "within" the Sulphide Claim is "Map
#I" prepared by the U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. in 1954. Ex. DD; Addendum H. This map confirms the
location of a road extending off of South Camp Bay Road southeasterly, near the common boundary
of Govt. Lots 2 and 1, and traversing over the "Honest John Claim." This road is distinct from South
Camp Bay Road and is consistent with the depictions in the 1949, 1951, 1960, and 1976 maps (Exs.
51-53, 57). The following factors support the conclusion that the road Thomason stated he extended
"within" the Sulphide Claim, in 1939, was not South Camp Bay Road. The so-called "Upper Road"
or "Thomason Road" is a road separate and distinct from South Camp Bay Road.
First, the evidence set forth above supports the conclusion that the Teape/Garrison group
mined the Sulphide Claim by water access. Second, if the Teape/Garrison party had road access to
the Claim (which they didn't), then it wouldn't have been necessary for Thomason to extend the road
"within said Claim." Third, South Camp Bay Road was authorized under an expressed easement
from John and Kate Van Schravendyk to Lida Putnam, and limited to Govt. Lots 1 and 2 as the
benefitted properties. It is clearly impractical if not impossible to mine the lower adit by access off
of South Camp Bay Road given that the lower adit is at the bottom of a veritable cliff and on the
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shore of the lake. More importantly, there is no map that shows South Camp Bay Road, a road
authorized under a private easement from Van Schravendyk to Putnam, extending over the two
hundred eighty (280) +/- feet of U.S.F.S. property necessary to reach the Sulphide Claim.
This conclusion is further supported by the following evidence. Dale Gill testified that nearly
twenty (20) years ago, when he first bought property accessed by South Camp Bay Road, that there
was no discernible road extending from the terminus of South Camp Bay Road near the Cummins'
property over and across the intervening 280 +/- feet of U.S.F.S. property to the north boundary of
the Sulphide Claim. Tr., pp. 863-64. Gill testified, "And it was basically a path when I first came
to the property and was looking everything over. I could not drive a car up here [from the terminus
of South Camp Bay Road to the northern boundary of the Sulphide Claim]." Id. Gill cleared an
access way so that he could drive a truck from the terminus of South Camp Bay Road to a bench he
had placed on the northern portion of Sulphide North. Tr., p. 864; Exs. SSSS, TTTT.
Second, the Latvalas hired a surveyor (Duffner) to demark the location of South Camp Bay
Road for purposes of appending the exhibit to their Complaint (and all amendments thereto). Ex.

B; Addendum A. That exhibit was prepared with the expressed intention of showing an extension
of South Camp Bay Road over the intervening 280 +/- feet of U.S.F.S. property. In actuality, as the
evidence showed, Duffner's initial exhibit labeled a "trail" across the U.S.F.S. property, consistent
with Gill's testimony. Ex. TT. Duffner later removed the descriptive term "trail-8 feet" as Bonnie
considered the term "counterproductive." Id.
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Third, if Latvalas' predecessor-in-title (the McConnaughey Estate), as the successor to
Thomason, claimed an easement over South Camp Bay Road, then the Estate would not have sought
to acquire access off of South Camp Bay Road through the Grubb property (Tract A of Cedarside ).
Exs. PP, QQ; Tr., pp. 905-06. And why would the agent of the Latvalas, their realtor, know that the
property was "boat access only" and "difficult to build on"? Ex. DDD.
The District Court relied upon evidence of mining activity on the Sulphide Claim, between
1948 and 1954, although that evidence hardly satisfies the clear and convincing standard. In 1939,
Thomason attempted to initiate work on the Sulphide Claim but that was short-lived. Ex. 75. All
work stopped and the property was still idle in 1946. Id. Thomason was, at the time, interested in
pursuing federal assistance which was available for projects "making a direct contribution to the
national security, such as the possibility of producing material for a government stockpile." Ex. 76.
Thomason gave the U.S. Department of the Interior directions to the Sulphide Claim, identifying the
same as "County road from Sagle, Idaho within one-half mile of property, private road balance of
distance." Id. at p. 276. "County road" is likely a reference to Camp Bay Road. Thomason then
references a "private road," as opposed to "private roads," from the presumed terminus of Camp Bay
Road.
Some six (6) years later, in 1954, Thomason leased the Sulphide and adjoining unpatented
claims to Anderson and Johnson, operating as "A&J Mining Company." Ex. 80. A & J Mining
Company then made application to the U.S. Department of the Interior for financial assistance. Ex.
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78. As part of this application process, A & J consented to a lien for the benefit of the United States
to secure, among other things, the payment of any royalties that might be due the United States in
the event the application was granted. Ex. 79.
Attached to the Consent to Lien form (Ex. 79) was a four-page document headed "A. & J.
Mining Company." R., pp. 303-306. The document bears all the indicia ofa solicitation prospective
by a speculative mining venture given that the applicant "had no previous experience in operating
a mine." R., p. 304.
The document further states, "There are good roads right to both mine shafts." Id. Yet, at
the same time, and on the same page, the document states, "There has been no past production [as
of 19 54] in either the upper or lower tunnels." A prospectus evidences, at best, "current production
from the upper tunnel" by A & J Mining Company, which only began operation on the property
under a Mining Lease dated September 28, 1954. Exs. 79, 80. In other words, the District Court
relied upon Ex. 79, in isolation of all other evidence, to support the conclusion that the upper and
lower adits were being mined for six (6) years (1948-1954) by access from both Thomason Road and
South Camp Bay Road. The District Court clearly erred.
The District Court did not consider Ex. 79, authored by A & J Mining Company as Lessee,
being limited to the actions of the Lessee. Yet the Lessee acknowledged that "[t]here has been no
past production in either the upper or lower tunnel." Id. Any reference to "current production from
the upper tunnel" does not establish access over South Camp Bay Road nor does it establish five (5)
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years of subsequent access on any road, be it Thomason Road or South Camp Bay Road. The
application for federal assistance was ultimately denied a month later. Ex. DD. Bonnie Latvala
testified that she had no personal knowledge of any mining activity on any of Thomason's claims
(including the Sulphide Claim) after the application for federal assistance was denied in October of
1954. Tr., p. 440.
The A & J Mining Company application was initially reviewed by the U.S. Department of
the Interior on August 12, 1954. Ex. 78. The Examiner noted that there had been "very little
development" completed to date. Id., p. 290. The Examiner also stated, "The access road [not roads]
is in fair shape and in use by summer campers and fishermen." R., p. 290. The reference to the
"access road" is most likely a reference to Camp Bay Road (a public road), which terminates at the
water's edge (as South Camp Bay Road doesn't reach the waters of the Lake). The Examiner also
notes that "ore shipments were made from 194 7 through 195 l ," a statement which is contradicted
by the separate statement of A & J Mining Company that "[t]here has been no past production in
either the upper or lower tunnels" as of 1954.

Ex. 79. In any event, this contradiction

notwithstanding, it is more probable than not that the Examiner accessed the property by Thomason
Road since current production was then being claimed only from the upper tunnel. Ex. 79, p. 1087.
The Examiner concluded, 'The owners and lessees are not mine operators so that a ·promotional
venture' may be their objective." Ex. 78, p. 1095.
Perhaps what is most probative, even more so by way of admission, is the final denial from

39

the U.S. Department of the Interior on October 25, 1954. Ex. DD. In their Statement of Facts, supra,
Appellants have already discussed how the October 1954 U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. Report was not
produced by the Latvalas even though they were aware of the same. Moreover, even though the 1954
U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. Report includes the only independently prepared map of access to the Sulphide
Claim, while it was last alleged to have been mined, the Latvalas did not utilize the Report as an
exhibit at trial.
Attached to the denial is an October 18, 1954 Memorandum to the U.S. Department of the
Interior from representatives of the U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. R., pp. 593-601. The Memorandum
states that the claims are approximately 9.5 miles southeast of Sandpoint and that "[t]he roads
leading to the property are in fair condition and can probably be used all months of the year." R., p.
594. This statement does not, against the other evidence of record, support the conclusion that the
Sulphide Claim was being accessed for active mining between 1948 and 1954 by both the upper road
(Thomason Road) and the lower road (South Camp Bay Road). The use of the phrase "the roads"
could just as easily be a reference to all the roads taken over the 9.5 miles from Sandpoint. Perhaps
more tellingly, the U.S.G.S. and U.S.B.M. independently prepared a map ofaccess to the claims. R.,
p. 599; Addendum H. That map shows access exclusively off of Thomason Road, to the upper adit,
and no access off of South Camp Bay Road. Id.
The law disfavors the creation of prescriptive easements. That is why the law requires proof
by "clear and convincing evidence." That burden is all the more applicable here where the Latvalas
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purchased a parcel disclosed and identified as land-locked and then selectively produced
documentary evidence over which no living person still has personal knowledge. Appellants
respectfully submit that given the evidence outlined above, which is in and of itself substantial
evidence, the District Court clearly erred, as a matter of fact and law, in finding that the elements of
adverse possession had been proven. There was no identified five-year period of continuous access
over South Camp Bay Road for active mining operations, whether between 1948 and 1954 or
otherwise. 17

5.

The District Court Erred in Disregarding Evidence of
How Any Use of South Camp Bay Road, by Thomason,
Began.

Under the general rule, the burden of proof with respect to a claim for a prescriptive easement
proceeds as follows:
[P]roof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the
prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption
that the use was adverse and under a claim of right. The burden is then on the owner
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Despite three (3) amendments to their original Complaint, the Latvalas did not assert a
claim for a prescriptive easement over the upper road (Thomason Road). One can infer that by
asserting such a claim, the Latvalas would have had to rely upon the October 1954
U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. depiction of Thomason Road. Yet since the Latvalas did not produce the
document, despite its clear relevancy, they focused their efforts exclusively on South Camp Bay
Road. Over the Appellants' objection, the District Court granted the Latvalas' post-trial motion to
conform the pleadings, pursuant to IRCP l 5(b )(2), to include an additional prescriptive claim over
the Thomason Road. R., pp. 2055-56.[Decision at pp. 35-36]. Even so, the claim was denied based
on the District Court's finding that: '"The Upper Branch [Thomason Road] of the road is overgrown
with vegetation, is not passable, and its exact location at the time of active mining operations cannot
be determined with any certainty .... [I]t is an exercise in futility to grant an easement over a road
that no one can locate on the ground." Id.
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of the servient tenement to show that the use was permissive, or by virtue of a
license, contract, or agreement.
Melendez v. Hintz, 111 Idaho 401,404, 724 P.2d, 1137 (1986) (citing West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,
557,511 P.2d, 1326 (1973) (emphasis added)).
The District Court held, with respect to the element of "adverse and under a claim of right,"
that "the defendants have presented no evidence showing that the use of the Lower Branch of the
road, in the location of present-day South Camp Bay Road, for mining purposes by "Thomason"
from 1946 to 1954, was with permission .... " R., p. 2062. In point of fact, the Comi disregarded
evidence as to how the use began.
Jim Green, President of Appellant Green Enterprises, Inc., testified at trial. Jim is the eldest
grandchild of Bonner County pioneers John and Kate Van Schravendyk. Tr., pp. 1128-29. Jim's
mother was Jeanne Green, daughter of John and Kate. Tr., p. 1155. Jim's grandparents John and
Kate homesteaded the current Green Enterprises property, and lived on the same in a cabin. Tr., pp.
1129,1131.
Thomason acquired the Sulphide Claim by a Deed recorded on September 18, 1939. R., p.
2025. On September 24, 1939, Thomason and Fred Schillng located the four (4) unpatented claims
adjoining the Sulphide Claim, including the Honest John Claim. R., pp. 2025-26,

,r,r 14-18.

Thomason stated, "At that time [1939] I made a deal with a farmer ... to pay the cost of
development of the claims for an interest in the property." Ex. 75. The only person who had an
interest in the property other than Thomason's wife was Fred Schillng. R., pp. 2027-28. Thomason
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further stated that this farmer (who by process of elimination was Schillng):
built and equipped a 25 ton mill (which should not have been done at that time) and
neglected to do any amount of development work on the claims. He bought the
machinery and equipment on a monthly payment plan, unbeknown to me, and lost
this equipment for defaulting in his payments. That terminated this agreement and
stopped all work and the property has remained idle since 1939.
Ex. 75.
Admitted at trial was Ex. S (Green Enterprises). That exhibit consisted of a February 16,
1940 letter sent by John Van Schravendyk at Camp Bay to his daughter Jeanne who was a high
school student in Hope, Idaho. Tr., pp. 1155-56. In the letter, John wrote his daughter:
Iver Anderson and Fred Schillng are living in our little cabin. I find them
rather interesting to talk to. Anderson has been here since 1904 and knows many of
the old-timers I know. He is the mining expert of the concern. He seems to be quite
interested in the ore samples of the old Pollard Mine. He was up to look it over one
day. He said looked good.
They are milling lots of ore nowadays. Sometimes they run till midnight.
They have an electric lighting plant.
Id.

is

This evidence, before the trial court, in the form of Ex.Sand Jim Green's testimony (Tr.,
pp. 115 5-5 7), was virtually ignored. Read in the context of Thomason' s 1946 summary of prior
activity on the Sulphide Claim (Ex. 75), this evidence leads to the following inescapable
conclusions: (1) the "farmer" who had an interest in the mining venture was Fred Schillng; (2)
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Jim Green testified that "the old Pollard Mine" was a mine distinct from the Sulphide Claim
and located on the current Green Enterprises property. Tr., p. 1156.
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Schillng was milling on the property; (3) Schillng lived in a "little cabin" on the Van
Schravendyk/Green Enterprises property; (4) Schillng enjoyed a good relationship with John Van
Schravendyk; and (5) John Van Schravendyk was aware that any access Schillng and Thomason
made off of South Camp Bay Road was underway as he was aware that the mill was running,
sometimes till midnight. Given the totality of the circumstances, there is ample evidence as to how
the use began such that the use cannot be determined, some eighty (80) years later, by clear and
convincing evidence, to have been adverse. By all reasonable inferences, and certainly under a clear
and convincing standard, the use appears to have originated in a permissive manner. The District
Court wholly disregarded the evidence of permissive use. 19
Additional grounds exist for finding that Appellants introduced substantial evidence to
support a finding that any use of South Camp Bay Road, on Appellant Green Enterprises, Inc. 's
portion of South Camp Bay Road, was not presumptively adverse. Legal support can be found under
the doctrine of neighborly accommodation or joint use.
In Melendez v. Hintz, supra, this Court explained:
[T]he general rule has [an] exception which is applicable in the absence of the
evidence as to whether the use began adversely or with permission of the servient
19

Appellants acknowledge that this evidence of permissiveness only applies to property
owned by John Van Schravendyk (and now Green Enterprises). That having been said, there is ample
evidence that Thomason's use of those portions of South Camp Bay Road that are located on the
Green Enterprises' property was permissive. Without access over the Green property, which is the
initial segment of South Camp Bay Road, the Latvalas cannot access the remainder of South Camp
Bay Road to its terminus at the U.S.F.S. property, nor could they access Thomason Road (if it could
be found).
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owner. In Simmons v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 144, 118 P.2d 740, 744 (1941), the
Court said:
The rule would seem to be that when the owner of real property
constructs a way over it for his own use and convenience, the mere
use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be
presumed to be by way oflicense or permission ....
Melendez, 111 Idaho at 140 (citations omitted). The Melendez Court also cited with favor the
following rationale from the Nevada Supreme Court:
Where a roadway is established or maintained by a landowner for his own use, the
fact that his neighbor also makes use of it, under circumstances which in no way
interfere with use by the landowner himself, does not create a presumption of
adverseness. The presumption is that the neighbor's use is not adverse but is
permissive and the result of neighborly accommodation on the part of the landowner.
Melendez, 111 Idaho at 405 (citing Turrillas v. Quilici, 72 Nev. 289, 303 P .2d 1002 (1956)
(emphasis added)).
In Melendez, this Court discussed the rationale for the joint use/neighborly accommodation
exception to the general rule:
To establish a prescriptive right in a roadway, it is essential that the use of the
way must constitute some actual invasion or infringement of the right of the owner ...
Simmons v. Perkins, supra. If the use is with permission of the owner of the property
no invasion or infringement of the owner's rights occurs. Adverse use is some actual
invasion or infringement that is made without permission of the owner. As we have
noted, mere proof that the owner "acquiesced" in the use is not proof that the use was
with the owner's consent or permission ....
Understanding the basis for the Simmons rule helps to determine the limits
of its application. There should be no presumption that the use originated adversely
to the owner unless the use itself constitutes some invasion or infringement upon the
rights of an owner. Where one person merely uses a roadway in common with his
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neighbor, without damage to the roadway, without interfering with the neighbor's use
of the roadway, and where the neighbor has established and maintained the roadway
on his owner property for his own purposes, only the most minimal intrusion is made
into the owner's dominion over his property. Logically, a use which is not in fact
adverse to the owner provides no basis for the presumption that the use is adverse ....
Melendez, 111 Idaho at 405.
The facts admitted at trial, as set forth above, establish that the use ofportions of South Camp
Bay Road, on the property of Green Enterprises, began with the knowledge of the then-owner thereof
(John Van Schravendyk), in late 1939 or 1940. John was providing residential accommodations for
Fred Schillng, who was partners with Thomason in the unpatented claims jointly located by
Thomason and Schillng adjacent to the Sulphide Lode. Under the caselaw cited above, there was no
"actual invasion or infringement" of those portions of South Camp Bay Road over the Green
Enterprises' property and hence "no basis for the presumption that [said] use [was] adverse."
Melendez, 111 Idaho at 405.

B.

The District Court Erred by Determining that the Latvalas' Proposed
Development and Residential Use Associated with the Latvala Property
Did Not Constitute an Unreasonable Expansion of the Easement they
Claimed by Prescription.
1.

Standards Applicable to Limitations on the Expansion of
an Easement Created By Prescription.

In Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., supra, the Court held:
As a general rule, an easement acquired by prescription is confined to the right as
exercised during the prescriptive period. Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Investment
Co., 100 Idaho 566, 602 P.2d 64 (1979); Restatement of Property, Section 477
(1944 ). While some change of usage is permissible, "any changes in the use of a
46

prescriptive easement cannot result in an unreasonably increased burden on the
servient estate .... " Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 639, 570 P.2d 870.
Elderv. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho at 359. In Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho 633,570 P.2d
870 (I 977), this Court specifically held that the issue of an unreasonable increased burden by
expanded use is a question of law.
The question of whether the increased use of the road amounts to an
"expansion of the original easement" or merely an "increase in degree of use" is a
question of law.
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 638. The Weisshaupt Court further explained:
Prescription acts as a penalty against a landowner and thus the rights obtained
by prescription should be closely scrutinized and limited by the Court .... The
quantity of use of an easement obtained by prescription is determined and fixed to
the right as exercise for the full period oftime required by statutes.

We emphasize, however, that any changes in the use of a prescriptive
easement cannot result in an unreasonably increased burden on the servient estate and
that the increase in use must be reasonably foreseeable at the time the easement is
established.
Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 638-39.

2.

Historic Uses of the Latvala Property.

In the event this Court affirms the District Court's determination to quiet title to a
prescriptive easement of ingress, egress, and utilities to the Latvala property, then this Court should
limit such an easement so as to specifically exclude from permitted uses the Latvalas' intended
residential and associated development of their property. The Latvalas' operative complaint
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specifically sought permission for residential construction and occupation by way of access over
South Camp Bay Road. Moreover, the Latvalas seek to use South Camp Bay Road to construct
significant improvements on the Gill property to facilitate access from the terminus of South Camp
Bay Road. The Latvalas' proposed uses unreasonably increase the burden on the servient estate over
and above those historic uses to which the Latvalas may make claim.
To put it succinctly, the Latvala prope1ty has never been used for anything. The mill was not
located on the Latvala property. Tr., p. 439. The only other structure for which there is evidence, an
old tool and dry shed near the lower adit, was not on the Latvala property. Id. The "camp" which
was present during the U.S.G.S./U.S.B.M. inspection in October of 1954 was not on the Latvala
property. Tr., p. 450. There is no evidence that anyone has ever built a structure for residential use
or anything else on the Latvala property. Tr., p. 977. The two (2) mine adits are on the Gill property,
not the Latvala property. Tr., p. 972.
Substantial evidence detailed in Section IV.A, supra, proves, under a clear and convincing
standard, that any access to the Sulphide Lode before 1939 was more probably than not by water and
that any access after 1939 was by virtue of Thomason Road. Based on that evidence, it is more
probable than not that the Sulphide Claim has never been mined by anyone utilizing access over
South Camp Bay Road. This includes the Latvalas. The extent of the Latvalas' "mining" activity on
their property has consisted of Matt Latvala picking up "a few rocks." Tr., p. 968.
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3.

The Latvalas' Proposed Construction Over the Gill
Property, from the Terminus of South Camp Bay Road,
Constitutes an Unreasonable Expansion in Use in and of
Itself.

The District Court fixed the location of the Latvalas' expressed easement over the Gill
property. R., pp. 2222-23. The Latvalas' expressed easement, as determined by the District Court,
proceeds from the gate at the boundary between the U.S.F.S. 280 +/- foot parcel and the Gill
property. Ex. RRR (taken looking north). The access route of the Latvalas' easement will then
proceed southerly across the Gill property, extending southward from the bench shown in Ex. SSS
(taken looking south). See also Ex. TTT.
The easement awarded the Latvalas over the Gill property was designed by civil engineer Jeff
Jensen. Tr., p. 652. Jensen prepared a conceptual drawing of the Latvala easement based upon a
location designated by the Latvalas. Tr., pp. 670-71. Although he had designed perhaps a hundred
prior roads, Jensen had not designed "very many" like the one requested by the Latvalas. Tr., p. 651.
The easement awarded by the Court is twenty-five (25) feet wide with a road surface of ten
(10) feet therein. R., pp. 2249-50. According to Jensen, the planned road, essentially being located
on extremely steep topography, will require at leasttwo hundred (200) feet ofupslope retaining walls
and approximately 190 feet of downslope retaining walls. Tr., pp. 652-53. The road is proposed to
be carved out of a rocky outcropping, and the retaining walls could vary in height from four (4) to
ten ( 10) feet. Tr., pp. 653-54. In order to remain structurally sound, the 390 +/- feet of retaining wall
will require a base or pedestal measuring four (4) feet in width. Id ..
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Prior to constructing the necessary pedestals and retaining walls, the easement area will have
to be excavated. Excavation would occur through blasting or through a jack hammer. Tr., p. 679.
Given the topography of the easement area, located on a hill, care would have to be given so that
excavated materials did not tumble down the hill, outside of the easement area, over the Gill
property, and into Lake Pend Oreille. Tr., p. 662. In any event, much of the material that would be
blasted and jack hammered would have to be removed by large dump trucks. Id.

It is possible that some portions of the upslope retaining wall might not be necessary if the
blasting and jack hammering encounter bedrock. In other words, if the upslope exposes bedrock,
then bedrock itself can suffice as a retaining wall. Tr., p. 809. In either event, there would be "a
significant volume of bedrock to remove." Id.

If a retaining wall is constructed in whole or in part, it could be constructed by pre-fabricated
concrete blocks. Tr., p. 655. Such a project could require three hundred fifty (350) such concrete
blocks, each weighing two thousand (2,000) pounds. Id. The blocks would need to be transported
to the site over South Camp Bay Road by a large truck. Id. So too would the materials to be removed
through drilling and blasting.

If the retaining wall is created by poured-in-place concrete, then cement mixers will be
required to reach the job site over South Camp Bay Road. These vehicles are approximately thirtytwo (32) feet long, and between eight (8) and nine and a half (9½) feet wide. Tr., p. 657. At least
twenty (20) cement mixers would be necessary to construct the poured-inNplace retaining wall. Id.

50

There is no staging area at the entrance or terminus of South Camp Bay Road. Tr., p. 658.
Hence, the veritable parade of flatbeds, excavators, and cement mixers would travel down South
Camp Bay Road, over and on the properties of the Appellants, and then back out the same way.
South Camp Bay Road's current width generally varies from between ten (10) to twelve (12) feet.
Tr., pp. 1109-10.
Evidence was offered by Appellants at trial that typical daily use of South Camp Bay Road
varies from between one car in the winter to four (4) cars in the spring, to perhaps a dozen cars in
the summer. Tr., p. 1109. Defendant Russ Edwards, whose house is built on the edge of South Camp
Bay Road, where no county setbacks apply, testified that the Latvalas' proposed construction on the
easement awarded over the Gill property, if facilitated by South Camp Bay Road, would cause
increased traffic and an intensification of use. Tr., pp. 1111-12.

4.

As a Matter of Law, the Latvalas' Proposed Use of South
Camp Bay Road Amounts to an Impermissible
"Expansion of the Original Easement" Claimed by
Prescription.

In Gibbens v. Weisshaupt, 98 Idaho at 638, this Court held, "The question of whether the
increased use of the road amounts to an 'expansion of the original easement' or merely an 'increase
in degree of use' is a question of law."
While some change of usage is permissible, "any changes in the use of a prescriptive
easement cannot result in an unreasonably increased burden on the servient estate.

"
Elder v. Northwest Timber Co., 101 Idaho at 359 (citation omitted). What the Latvalas suggest is
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that they can take an easement claimed by prescription over an unimproved and meandering private
country road, and expand the same from a few cars a day to dozens and dozens of pieces of heavy
equipment, which would occupy the entire road width, to construct a home on property that has
never been used for anything and that is effectively land-locked by property of the U.S. Forest
Service. Against this background, the District Court concluded that residential use on the Latvala
property "was foreseeable." The Court's ruling defies logic.
The Latvala property represents the unused half of a mining claim patented in 1910. The
District Court found some relevance in the fact that the former Putnam property (Govt. Lots 1 and
2) was platted in 194 7 as the Cedarside Lots. Yet Govt. Lots 1 and 2 are private property separated
from the Sulphide Claim by public property of the U.S.F.S. How development on the Cedarside
property could reasonably be expected to apply to a land-locked mining claim is questionable. The
Court also found foreseeability of residential use in the fact that "at least two structures have been
built on the mine property- a mill and a tool and dry shed, both of which were in disrepair by 1954."
R., p. 2067. Both "structures" were on the Gill property, not the Latvala property, and neither has
any semblance of relevance to a residential use.
C.

The District Court Erred in Awarding Costs to Plaintiffs Latvala.

The District Court awarded costs to the Latvalas, as against the Appellants, jointly and
severally. R., pp. 2198-2201. For the reasons advanced, the District Court's Decision, awarding the
Latvalas a prescriptive easement over those portions of South Camp Bay Road owned by these
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Appellants, and expanding the use of the same to facilitate construction of a right-of-way on the Gill
property (under the Latvalas' expressed easement) and residential construction and use of the Latvala
property, was in error. The award of costs, as to these Appellants, should be reversed.
V.

CONCLUSION.
For the reasons set forth above, the Court should reverse the Judgment of the District Court

and remand for entry of judgment in favor of Appellants on the Latvalas' claim for a prescriptive
easement over those portions of South Camp Bay Road owned by Appellants. Alternatively, if this
Court finds it appropriate to affirm the District Court's ruling in the context of the prescriptive
easement claim, it should nonetheless reverse the District Court's Judgment which allowed for the
expansion of use of any easement claimed by prescription to include residential use of the Latvala
property and construction of road improvements within the area encompassed by the judiciallydecreed expressed easement on the Gill property. Appellants further request that the costs awarded
post-trial by the District Court be reversed and that Appellants be awarded their costs on appeal.

n,.-1:t::.
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